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Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language
In the Pepsi Generation
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss*
The Mets are one offour major league baseball teams that boast their own cloth-
ing store. - Gerald Eskenazi, noting that the Angels, Red Sox and Pi-
rates are about to join the Mets, Padres, Brewers and A's in running
such enterprises'
When I campaign alone I'm approachable. Women talk to me, complain, but
when I'm with Ted I'm a Barbie doll. - Marcia Chellis, quotingJoan Ken-
nedy's account of her life with Edward Kennedy. 2
What does all this consolidating mean for publishing? The birth of McBooks.
Sheldon Himelfarb, reporting the effect of "McEficiency" and
"McMarket research" on the publishing business after Random House
purchased the Crown Publishing Group.3
'Star War' Funds Cut in the Senate -Headline, New York Times, Septem-
ber 27, 1989.4
Their concern was how to pretend they had never left home. What hotels in Ma-
drid boasted king-sized Beautyrest mattresses? What restaurants in Tokyo offered
Sweet 'n' Low? Did Amsterdam have a McDonalds? Did Mexico City have a
Taco Bell? Did any place in Rome serve Chef Boyardee ravioli?" -Anne-
Tyler, describing the guide books prepared by her protagonist, Macon
Leary.5
Trademarks have come a long way. Originating in the stratified
economy of the middle ages as a marketing tool of the merchant class,6
these symbols have passed into popular culture. During the journey,
ideograms that once functioned solely as signals denoting the source,
origin, and quality of goods, have become products in their own right,
valued as indicators of the status, preferences, and aspirations of those
who use them. 7 Some trademarks have worked their way into the English
language; others provide bases for vibrant, evocative metaphors.8 In a
sense, trademarks are the emerging lingua franca: with a sufficient com-
* Professor of Law, New York University. I wish to thank Ralph Brown, Dorothy Nelkin and
Diane Zimmerman for their helpful comments, Thomas Nagel for thought-provoking discussion,
New York University law student Lisa Bialkin for her very able assistance, and the Filomen
D'Agostino and Max E. Greenberg Research Fund for its financial support.
1 Eskenazi, Sports Logos Now Symbols of Big Profits, N.Y. Times, June 19, 1989, at Al, col. 2.
2 M. CHELLIS, THE JOAN KENNEDY STORY: LIVING WITH THE KENNEDYS 191 (Jove ed. 1986).
3 N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 1988, § 4, at 25, col. 1.
4 Rosenthal, 'Star War' Funds Cut in the Senate, N.Y. Times, Sept. 27, 1989, at Al, col. 1.
5 A. TYLER, THE ACCIDENTAL TOURIST I 1 (Berkley ed. 1986).
6 F. SCHECHTER, THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW RELATING TO TRADEMARKS (1925).
7 See Eskenazi, supra note I (noting that combined sales of items bearing the logos of the teams
of the National Football League, the National Basketball Association and Major League Baseball
amount to billions of dollars); Bates, Big Bucks in Boosterism; Marketing College Souvenirs Has Become a
Billion-dollar Business, L.A. Times, Sept. 25, 1989, Pt. 4, at 5, col. 1.
8 See G. CANNON, HISTORICAL CHANGE AND ENGLISH WORD-FORMATION, RECENT VOCABULARY
250 (1987).
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mand of these terms, one can make oneself understood the world over,
and in the process, enjoy the comforts of home.
Trademark law has not kept pace with trademark practice. Con-
cerned initially with maintaining the lines of communication between the
mercantile class and its customers, the law encouraged entrepreneurs to
invest in quality-producing activities by protecting the goodwill that in-
hered in their source-identifying marks. Thus, in both state unfair com-
petition cases and federal trademark actions, claims focused on the
impact of the mark on purchasing decisions. By the same token, defenses
centered on the commercial requirements of the competitive market-
place. The terms that delimited the reach of trademark law--consumer
confusion, gap bridging, fair use, genericity, abandonment-were under-
stood strictly by reference to these commercial interests.
But as trademark owners have begun to capitalize on the salience of
these symbols in the culture, the justifications that formerly delineated
the scope of the law have lost significance. The Mets' right to prevent
others from selling banners, caps, and tee shirts marked with its logo
could not initially be explained on quality-promotion grounds so long as
it was clear that fans are not confused, and that they did not regard the
franchise as insuring the quality of anything but a baseball team.9 Nor
does traditional trademark law offer an account for, or limits to, McDon-
ald's claim to control non-food uses of the prefix "Mc,"i or George Lu-
cas's attempt to exclude public interest groups from utilizing the title of
his movie, "Star Wars."' I
Lacking the traditional analytical tools provided by trademark law,
courts have lately attempted to apply first amendment jurisprudence to
such claims. But as San Francisco Arts &Athletics Inc. v. United States Olympic
Committee 12 ("Gay Olympics ") demonstrates, although the Constitution
supplies a normative principle favoring public access to the tools of ex-
pression, the body of law that has developed under the first amendment
provides a surprisingly uncongenial framework for analysis. Perhaps this
provision is simply too blunt an instrument to parse rights to individual
words; perhaps its focus on the communication of ideas makes it an inap-
propriate way to think about the linguistic material by which ideas are
conveyed. In any event, the Court's decision to give the United States
Olympic Committee (USOC) plenary authority over the word "Olympic"
puts in jeopardy the public's ability to avail itself of the powerful rhetori-
cal capacity of trademarks. Indeed, the controversy surrounding the
burning of an American flag-the trademark of the United States-dem-
onstrates how little the law understands the evocative significance of
9 See, e.g., Boston Professional Hockey Ass'n v. Dallas Gap & Emblem Mfg., 510 F.2d 1004 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 868 (1975).
10 See, e.g., Quality Inns Int'l, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 695 F. Supp. 198 (D. Md. 1988).
II See, e.g., Lucasfilm Ltd. v. High Frontier, 622 F. Supp. 931 (D.D.C. 1985).
12 483 U.S. 522 (1987).
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trademarks and how poorly current jurisprudential techniques deal with
conflicting claims to these ideograms.' 3
This Article attempts to develop a framework for allocating rights in
words. After quickly recounting how the changing legal climate has
tended to grant trademark owners ever greater control over their marks,
Part I explains why these recently developed rules imperfectly measure,
and therefore provide inadequate access to, the expressive dimension of
trademarks. Part II takes a hard look at the connection between words
and communication. It scrutinizes one example of the Court's handi-
work in this area, and then draws upon the linguistic literature to show
that discourse is indeed inhibited as control over words is lost. This Part
suggests that since intellectual property law represents the single most
coherent attempt to analyze rights in words, its commerce-oriented doc-
trines can be used as models upon which to base more expressively-di-
rected safeguards. These new principles would owe their justification to
first amendment jurisprudence, and would supplement the analytical
framework that has been its progeny. To demonstrate how this sugges-
tion would work, the Article ends with the construction of a doctrine of
"expressive genericity," which protects access to the marketplace of
ideas in a manner similar to the way that trademark's genericity defense
has protected the marketplace of commerce.
This effort should not be understood as normative in the sense that I
consider the guidelines it recommends the correct method for allocating
rights in words. In fact, I do not believe that there is a tenable theory for
plenary control over trademarks. As Part I makes clear, the justifications
supporting other intellectual property rights, such as patents and copy-
rights, do not apply to expressive uses of trademarks because free rider-
ship on the commercial aspect of marks is not a problem and besides,
there is little need to create economic incentives to encourage businesses
to develop a vocabulary with which to conduct commerce. Furthermore,
the rationale underlying trademark law is fully effectuated by protecting
the significance of marks in the principal markets of their proprietors.
Nonetheless, if courts continue to permit trademark owners to extend
their control, a framework for identifying and protecting core expressive
interests will need to be developed.14
13 See Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989). Cf Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 19-21
(1971)(noting the manyjurisprudential classifications that fail to categorize an attempt to criminalize
the use of particular words).
14 Thus, it should be emphasized that expressive concerns could be equally well protected by
simply cutting back on the scope of trademark law. Signaling capacity could, for example, be fully
protected by insuring exclusivity in words and symbols only as they appear on labels. So long as the
public understood that the label (as statutorily defined) was the only place to look for a designation
of source or origin, trademarks could be made freely available for all other purposes. This Article,
however, accepts the expansion of trademark rights beyond the signaling core and attempts to create
safeguards for expressive interests within that framework.
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I. Tracing the Expansion: A Trademark Approach
Linguists comment that without a metalanguage with which to write,
it is difficult to avoid tautology when discussing what words do. 15 Ac-
cordingly, I begin with a brief statement on nomenclature. I call any de-
vice or symbol in which exclusive rights are sought a "trademark," a
"mark," or an "ideogram" and consider its central role to be that of
identifying goods and services and distinguishing them from those man-
ufactured or sold by others. 16 I call this the "signaling" function of the
mark. For instance, the word "Barbie" on a particular full-figured doll
with a highly cosmetized face and an extensive wardrobe functions as a
signal when it identifies Mattel as the manufacturer of a certain toy and
signifies that the qualities associated with other Mattel products are also
true of the doll.
The Joan Kennedy quotation at the beginning of this Article illus-
trates a second way in which trademarks are utilized. In referring to
"Barbie" in order to indicate that she was treated like a beautiful but
empty-headed accessory, Kennedy exploited a set of meanings that are
quite different from the ones invoked by Mattel, and I label this use of
the trademark "expressive." Although Marcia Chellis quoted Kennedy
in a commercial product (her book), the absence of a connection between
the presence of the word "Barbie" and a decision to purchase the book
means that the word was not being used in what I have defined as its
signaling sense.
If these two contexts exhausted the possible uses of marks, trade-
mark law would be quite simple. Signaling usages of trademarks by par-
ties other than the trademark owner would be actionable; other usages
would be entirely permissible. The first use would be protected-and,
indeed, is protected by both federal and state lawl 7 -- because exclusivity
is essential to an efficient marketplace. Without an unambiguous signal
for goods, consumers would have no way to apply their past experience
to future purchasing decisions. This absence would reduce suppliers' in-
centives to invest in quality-producing and brand-differentiating activi-
ties as the benefits of the investment could not be captured through
15 See, e.g., 0. AKHMANOVA, LEXICOLOGY: THEORY AND METHOD 5-7 (1972); Jakobson, Two Aspects
of Language and Two Types ofAphasic Disturbances, in R.JAKOBSON & M. HALLE, FUNDAMENTALS OF LAN-
GUAGE 81 (2d rev. ed. 1971).
16 This definition is based on § 45 of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1988). I intend, how-
ever, to use the word "trademark" more comprehensively than it is used in the Act. That is,
although for clarity's sake, I speak of trademarks and goods, the observations in the Article apply to
service, certification, and collective marks, as well as marks, logos and advertising motifs protected
under state law. In addition, many of my conclusions are also applicable to the emerging right of
publicity. See, e.g., Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989) (challenging Federico Fellini's
use of the name and image of Ginger Rodgers in his movie, Fred and Ginger).
17 The Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1988), is the principal source of federal protection
for trademarks. It is supplemented by various other provisions, including the laws and regulations
of the Federal Trade Commission, see, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58, the criminal law, 18 U.S.C. § 2320,
and international trade laws and treaties, e.g., the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial
Property, Mar. 20, 1883, 25 Stat. 1372, T.S. No. 37, as revised, [1970] 21 U.S.T. 1583, T.I.A.S. 6923.
States protect trademarks through their common law of unfair competition and a variety of
statutory provisions, see, e.g., UNIFORM DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES ACT, 7A U.L.A. 265 (1966); Al-
exander & Coil, The Impact of New State Unfair Trade Practices Acts on the Field of Unfair Competition, 67
TRADEMARK REP. 625 (1977).
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repeat sales to loyal customers. In addition, resource misallocations
would occur whenever ambiguities in the marking of goods led consum-
ers to purchase products unsuited to their needs.' 8 Expressive uses of
marks do not usually involve purchasing decisions. Accordingly, no
prohibitions on such usages are generally necessary.
Somewhat unfortunately, however, hybrid usages of trademarks are
also possible. It is these uses, which exist along the spectrum between
what might be called their sigihaling and expressive functions, that have
caused most of the difficulties. The easiest cases are, of course, those
closest to the poles. On the expressive side, these are cases like Prestonet-
tes, Inc. v. Coty, 19 and Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Sanders,20 in which marks
are utilized commercially, but not in the signaling sense. In Prestonettes, a
reference to the trademark owner's business was made in connection
with the sale of scented face powder in order to fully describe the prod-
uct's ingredients; in Sanders, the original labels on rebuilt spark plugs
were left in place to denote their history. Finding it clear that the trade-
marks "Coty" and "Champion" were being used in a manner similar to
the way that Joan Kennedy used "Barbie," to convey information about
attributes other than source, and that the uses were necessary to fully
describe the merchandise, the Court found both permissible. The Lan-
ham Act now protects the nonsignaling aspect of such references under
the rubric of fair use.21 To the extent that a particular symbol becomes
indispensible in describing goods, the usage is likewise safeguarded, but
under the concept of genericity. 22
The easy cases on the opposite pole are ones that involve signaling
uses of the mark, but not in the commerce of the trademark owner. In
these cases, core trademark interests are endangered when the trade-
mark owner's message becomes garbled in the manner in which it is con-
fused by dual usage in the same market. That is, if it is likely that the
consumer will translate dissatisfaction with the second user's product
into disappointment with the trademark owner, then the interest in pre-
serving goodwill and encouraging investment in quality is undermined.
18 Initially, this problem was not thought to be a concern of trademark law. For an example,
consider the facts of American Washboard Co. v. Saginaw Mfg., 103 F. 281 (6th Cir. 1900), where
the court refused to enjoin the manufacturer of zinc washboards from using the trademark "Alumi-
num" on the ground that the defendant's use of a generic word could not be prohibited, and thus
could not give rise to an inference of passing off. Furthermore, the court reasoned that any confu-
sion suffered by consumers was actionable by them, not by the washboard manufacturer. As a result
of permitting continued sale of mismarked washboards, the demand curves for aluminum and zinc
may have been skewed. Some customers, although convinced that aluminum rendered clothing
cleaner than zinc, would nonetheless, purchase zinc washboards. This demand for zinc would then
presumably raise the price of the metal and divert supply to a use which no one, in fact, valued.
Perhaps for this reason, the result in the case was reversed legislatively, see § 43(a) of the Lanham
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125, which provides a right of action against misleading descriptions of products.
19 264 U.S. 359 (1924).
20 331 U.S. 125 (1947).
21 See § 33(b)(4) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4), which provides a defense fora "use
... which is descriptive of and used fairly and in good faith only to describe the goods to users .. "
22 See § 14(3) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3) (1988) (which permits cancellation of
registered marks that become generic); § 15(4), 15 U.S.C. § 1065(4) (which excepts generic marks
from the incontestability provisions of the Act); King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Indus., 321
F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1963) (finding that "thermos" (with a small "t") had entered the public domain).
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In Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Electronics Corp. ,23 for example, the Second Cir-
cuit announced a series of factors that quantify the likelihood that con-
sumers will be confused into thinking that Polaroid was the source of
electronic devices manufactured by Polarad. 24
This leaves the cases in the middle which would not be winners
under a rigid application of traditional trademark law, but which have
enjoyed a measure of success on a variety of theories. The paradigm
here is the "surplus value" case which can be illustrated by the hypotheti-
cal sale of a tee shirt adorned with the word "Barbie" and manufactured
by an apparel maker, let us say BVD. This is not a pure signaling case
because the decision whether the shirt is of good enough quality to
purchase will not be made easier by the presence of the word "Barbie,"
which has meaning (as a signal for Mattel) only in the toy market. At the
same time, however, the reference to "Barbie" on the tee shirt is not
identical to the use said to be made of that term by Joan Kennedy. Sale
of the Chellis book did not depend in any way on the presence of the
word in the manuscript. Indeed, it is unlikely that the purchaser would
have known it was there. In contrast, the only reason to choose a
"Barbie" shirt over a red one, or a "Betty Boop" one, is because the
word makes a difference to the buyer. I call this usage a "surplus value"
case because the existence of such a tee shirt means that someone at-
taches value to the word "Barbie" on the shirt, and that value is in excess
to, or a surplus over, its function as a signal about toys.
In a sense, the existence of surplus value cases is itself a sign that the
role of trademarks in the culture is different from what it once was. It is
doubtful that the demand for articles marked in this way derives from a
desire to accord advertising space to the trademark owner. Rather, these
terms apparently have meanings of their own. They may, for example,
serve to announce that characteristics associated with the product on
which they appear as signals, are true of, or endorsed by, the purchaser;
they may create an identification between the buyer and the trademark
owner, or act as a vehicle for commenting on the product or its manufac-
turer.25 The expressive dimension of trademarks may even enhance the
prestige and value of the items on which they appear as signals.26 But
whatever the reason behind the desire to utilize the mark, so long as the
23 287 F.2d 492 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 820 (1961).
24 In so doing, the court looked at: "the strength of [the] mark, the degree of similarity between
the two marks, the proximity of the products, the likelihood that the prior owner will bridge the gap,
actual confusion, and the reciprocal of defendant's good faith in adopting its own mark, the quality
of defendant's product, and the sophistication of the buyers." Id. at 495. It added that "[e]ven this
extensive catalogue does not exhaust the possibilities-the court may have to take still other vari-
ables into account." Id.
25 See, e.g., Grimes & Battersby, The Protection of Merchandising Properties, 69 TRADEMARK REP. 431
(1979)(describing status properties, such as the Gucci symbol, which are attractive for their "snob
appeal," personification properties, which identify the user with characteristics of the goods upon
which the mark normally appears, and popularity properties, which transfer "hype" in one market to
other markets).
26 See, e.g., Vuitton Et Fils S.A. v.J. Young Enters., Inc., 644 F.2d 769 (9th Cir. 1981)(use of
Louis Vuitton's "L.V." trademark in a pattern which affected the aesthetics of the items on which it
appeared).
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mark is not being used as a signal, traditional trademark law offers no
answer to the question of who should garner this value.
Not unsurprisingly, however, trademark owners have expressed a
preference in favor of themselves. One of their strategies for reaping
surplus benefits from their marks centers on stretching traditional princi-
ples by demonstrating that competitive harm in the market for the trade-
marked goods can result even from ostensibly nonsignaling usages. The
likelihood-of-confusion rationale of Polaroid has, accordingly, been
adapted to protect trademark owners against confusion in both their
original market in which consumers are likely to perceive a possibility of
entry. Thus, the doctrine now includes protection against usages that
may tend to injure the trademark owner's reputation,27 imply sponsor-
ship, 28 limit expansion opportunities, 29 and erode30 or tarnish3 l advertis-
ing values.3 2 In addition, some trademark owners have mounted
successful attacks based on a misdescription rationale;33 others have
claimed that to be effective, signals require protection from "dilution,"
erosion of distinctiveness which, they argue, can be caused even by non-
confusing uses.a 4
Of course, a more direct approach to the problem is also possible.
This is the argument that surplus value must go somewhere. Since trade-
mark owners created the value through their investments, it is they who
should garner whatever rewards are available. Or in our example, if a
barbie tee-shirt costs more than a regular tee-shirt, then as between Mat-
tel and BVD, the former should capture the extra profit because it is Mat-
tel that made the "Barbie" word famous, and therefore worth purchasing
27 See Denicola, Trademarks as Speech: Constitutional Implications of the Emerging Rationales for the Pro-
tection of Trade Symbols, 1982 Wis. L. REv. 158, 163 (citing L.E. Waterman Co. v. Gordon, 72 F.2d 272
(2d Cir. 1934), as seminal in accepting this rationale), which is based on the theory that even when
goods are dissimilar, the consumer will attribute defects in the junior user's product to the trade-
mark owner.
28 Id. at 167-68 (citing Boston Professional Hockey Ass'n v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., 510
F.2d 1004 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 868 (1975)). The theory behind extending this protection
is that consumers may retaliate against a perceived endorsement with which they disagree.
29 Id. at 167 (citing Scarves by Vera, Inc. v. Todo Imports Ltd., 544 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1976)).
Here, the notion is that trademark law should protect not only the original market, but also auxiliary
fields to which the trademark owner is likely to move.
30 Id at 182-83 (citing Tiffany & Co. v. Boston Club, Inc., 231 F. Supp. 836 (D. Mass. 1964)).
Trademark owners expand to new markets by capitalizing on the goodwill earned by the original
product line; by broadening trademark doctrine to protect against erosion, the law enhances the
incentive to safeguard the quality of merchandise and services.
31 Ide at 186 (citing Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1183 (E.D.N.Y. 1972)
(relying also on a confusion rationale)). Here, the principle seems to be that trademark owners will
be injured by bad mental associations with their products.
32 See also Grimes and Battersby, supra note 25.
33 See § 43 of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a); Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussy-
cat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1979).
34 See, e.g., Tiffany & Co. v. Boston Club, Inc., 231 F. Supp. 836, 844 (D. Mass. 1964). The
dilution theory has enjoyed some success in the states, where it has been accepted legislatively by
approximately 17 states, see J. MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 24:13 (2d ed.
1984) (1983 statistic), see, e.g., Act of May 2, 1947, ch. 307 § 7(a), 1949 Mass. Acts 300 (Current
version at MAss GEN. LAWs ANN. ch. 1 10B, § 12 (West). However, Congress refused to incorporate a
dilution provision into § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. 1115(a), when the Lanham Act was revised in 1988, see
H.R. REP. 1028, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1988).
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at a premium.a5 Conversely, to assign the reward to BVD would unjustly
enrich the apparel manufacturer, which would then "reap [a benefit]
where it has not sown."' 6
Recently, this argument has received acceptance. For example, in
deciding that the USOC could use a trademark-like provision of the Ama-
teur Sports Act of 197837 to prevent San Francisco Arts & Athletics
(SFAA), a gay-rights group, from calling their international athletic com-
petition the "Gay Olympic Games," the Supreme Court endorsed the
reaping and sowing idea,38 and then went on to say that:
Because Congress could reasonably conclude that the USOC had dis-
tinguished the word "Olympic" through its own efforts, Congress' de-
cision to grant the USOC a limited property right in the word
"Olympic" falls within the scope of trademark law protections. ..39
The Court also stated that:
One reason for Congress to grant the USOC exclusive control of the
word "Olympic," as with other trademarks, is to ensure that the USOC
receives the benefit of its own efforts so that the USOC will have an
incentive to continue to produce a "quality product," that, in turn,
benefits the public. 40
Preliminarily, it should be noted that although the Gay Olympics deci-
sion nominally applies only to a sui generis statute which was clearly in-
tended to provide the USOC with benefits greater than those accorded
ordinary trademark owners, 4 1 the notion of conceiving the investment in
signaling as creating an entitlement to control surplus value will surely
be transferred to trademark claims. 42 Given that the Court explicitly
cited trademark law as the source of its decision 43 and, moreover, ex-
35 Cf, e.g., Brown, Designers Wony About Self-Image, N.Y. Times, Oct. 12, 1989, at D23, col. 1
(noting the importance of "image" to the principal business of the trademark owner).
36 International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 239 (1918). This case announced
a theory of misappropriation, but in connection with news stories, not trademarks. Nonetheless, the
case is often cited in support of surplus value claims, see, e.g., Flextized, Inc. v. National Flexitized
Corp., 335 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 913 (1965).
37 36 U.S.C. § 380(a) provide that without the consent of the USOC, the symbol of the Interna-
tional Olympic Committee (5 interlocking rings), the emblem of the USOC, the words "Olympic,"
"Olympiad," and "Citius Altius Fortius," and designations of sponsorship by the USOC and the
International Olympic Committee cannot be used "for the purpose of trade, to induce the sale of
any goods or services, or to promote any theatrical exhibition, athletic performance, or
competition."
38 Gay Olympics, 483 U.S. 522, 532 (1987).
39 Id. at 534-35.
40 Id. at 537. The Court also justified its decision by noting that "[Congress] could also deter-
mine that unauthorized uses, even if not confusing, nevertheless may harm the USOC by lessening
the distinctiveness and thus the commercial value of the marks." Id. at 539. In another section of
the opinion, it reasoned that public access to a word must be "balanced against the principle that
when a word acquires value 'as the result of organization and the expenditure of labor, skill and
money' by an entity, that entity constitutionally may obtain a limited property right in the word." Id.
at 532 (quoting International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 239 (1918)).
41 The Amateur Sports Act differs from the Lanham Act (and state law) in that it does not re-
quire proof of consumer confusion. In addition, it does not incorporate Lanham Act defenses.
42 See, e.g., Board of Gov. of Univ. of N.C. v. Helpingstine, 714 F. Supp. 167, 177 n.5 (M.D.N.C.
1989) (acknowledging plaintiff's argument that Gay Olympics supports its right to the surplus value of
its marks, but deciding for the plaintiff without reaching the issue).
43 Thus, at 483 U.S. at 539, the Court cited Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection,
40 HARV. L. REV. 813, 825 (1927).
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pressly considered the needs of trademark owners in deciding the scope
of the USOC's rights,44 it can be assumed that the Court saw the differ-
ences between the two statutes as a question of ddgree, not kind. Other
courts are therefore likely to interpret its reasoning about the require-
ments of trademark owners as indicative of the appropriate direction in
which to take surplus value cases. A trademark owner may be required to
prove a greater likelihood of confusion than is required of the USOC, but
in the future its investment in popularizing the mark will be taken into
account so that it receives "the benefits of its own efforts."' 45 Thus, the
point at which relief is offered trademark owners can be expected to shift
from quite near the Polaroid side of the signaling spectrum to somewhere
much closer to the expressive pole.4 6
Because so many trademark usages are hybrid, free speech interests
are deeply implicated by this migration. If investment is dispositive of
the trademark owner's right to control, then the public's ability to evoke
the expressive dimension of marks is in danger of significant restriction.
Furthermore, fallacies in the fundamental assumptions made by courts
that have approved this "if value, then right" theory mean that the right
lacks a coherent limit. Without a principled way to bound the power of
control, it is not possible to fashion defenses analogous to the sort com-
monly found in real property, trademark, copyright, patent, or state-
based intellectual property law.
The point concerning the effect of the new theory on expressive con-
cerns can be demonstrated by considering the use of trademarks in paro-
dies, which have been considered important vehicles for social
commentary at least since the time of Chaucer. 47 Others have noted that
44 See 483 U.S. at 531-32, 537.
45 Id. at 537. The consideration of a trademark owner's investment in the mark represents a
change 'from existing law. See, e.g., Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 820 (1961), discussed supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text, where
none of the factors suggested by the court involved the effort expended by the senior user; Kellogg
Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 119 (1938) (money spent on making "shredded wheat" a
household word is "without legal significance" in determining the right of the owner to use the
mark); DuPont Cellophane Co. v. Waxed Prods. Co., 85 F.2d 75, 80 (2d Cir. 1936) (discounting the
relevance of the "billions reached" by DuPont's advertising "cellophane" for cellulose wrap), cert.
denied, 299 U.S. 601 (1936) and 304 U.S. 575 (1938).
46 To put this another way, the confusion question is often very close. Additional weight given
to the trademark owner by requiring the court to consider the extent of investment in the mark will
likely be dispositive in a number of cases.
The Court also may have changed trademark law by arguing that marks do not become generic
if they have acquired secondary meaning, 483 U.S. at 534-35. Secondary meaning has long been
used to demonstrate the distinctiveness of marks that would otherwise be considered too descriptive
to serve as signals. Prior to Gay Olympics, however, it was never thought that a generic word could
become a protectable trademark by virtue of its secondary meaning, or by its proprietor's investment
in creating secondary meaning, see, e.g., King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Indus., Inc., 321 F.2d
577, 581 (2d Cir. 1963)("No doubt the.., doctrine [of genericity] can be a harsh one for it places a
penalty on the manufacturer who has made skillful use of advertising."). See generally, Kravitz, Trade-
marks, Speech and the Gay Olympics Case, 69 B.U. L. REv. 131, 167-72 (1989). On this reasoning, the
court in American Washboard Co. v. Saginaw Mfg., 103 F. 281 (6th Cir. 1900), discussed supra note
18, could have held the word "Aluminum" the property of the American Washboard Company and
required competitors to talk of their own products as made of a shiny metal, mass number 13, with
atomic weight equal to 26.981.
47 See L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 28 (Ist Cir.), appeal dismissed, 483
U.S. 1013 (1987).
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even modest expansion of the domain of trademark law has threatened
such usages,48 but the problem is now much more severe. Girl Scouts v.
Personality Posters Manufacturing,49 for instance, involved the sale of pos-
ters depicting a pregnant girl dressed in a Girl Scout uniform over the
motto, "Be Prepared." Before courts began to adopt the new reasoning,
this was analyzed as a Polaroid type of case in which the unlikelihood of
consumer confusion led the court to conclude that the trademark owner
did not require relief. However, once the right to capture all the value in
a signal is accepted, it is difficult to see why the Girl Scouts should be
unable to control the humorous benefit that comes from contrasting
pregnancy with the public perception of Girl Scouts. Since it is the scout-
ing organization that created the perception, it should, under this rea-
soning, be the one to decide when, where, and if the slogan invoked. 50
Even usages much closer to the Joan Kennedy archetype may get
caught up in the shift. Thus, a pre-Gay Olympics court had no trouble
finding that a public interest group could use the connotations devel-
oped by George Lucas's movie, "Star Wars," to express the belief that
Ronald Reagan's defense initiative was expensive science fiction. 5 1 Post-
Gay Olympics, this sort of case may turn out to be much more difficult. "If
value, then right" is an appealing axiom, for it is suggestive of real prop-
erty and the relative ease with which claims in such cases are usually de-
cided in favor of the property owner.52
Indeed, the effectiveness of the dissents in Johnson v. Texas,53 the flag
burning case, owe much to this equation. After some rousing poetry,54
Chief Justice Rehnquist quoted property analogies in a variety of cases,
including Gay Olympics,55 and attempted, for constitutional purposes, to
use this analogy to distinguish the Nation's interest in its flag from the
words at issue in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire.56 Justice Stevens went so
far as to equate the burning of a single copy of the flag with desecration
48 See, e.g., Dorsen, Satiric Appropriation and the Law of Libel, Trademark, and Copyright: Remedies With-
out Wrongs, 65 B.U. L. REV. 923 (1985); Note, Trademark Parody: A First Use and First Amendment Analy-
sis, 72 VA. L. REV. 1079 (1986); Denicola, supra note 27.
49 304 F. Supp. 1228 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
50 Compare L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26 (1st Cir.) (pre-Gay Olympics case
refusing to enjoin magazine's parody of the L.L. Bean catalogue), appeal dismissed, 483 U.S. 1013
(1987), with American Express Co. v. Vibra Approved Labs., 10 U.S.P.Q. 2d 2006 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)
(post-Gay Olympics enjoining distribution of a "condom card" using the slogan "Never Leave Home
Without It").
51 Lucasfilm Ltd. v. High Frontier, 622 F. Supp. 931, 934 (D.D.C. 1985) (holding that the
"[d]efendants have not used the phrase ... in a way that might create confusion ... ").
52 Cf Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 402 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 109 S.
Ct. 326 (1988).
53 109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989).
54 Id. at 2549-50.
55 Id. at 2552 (citing the passage, "when a word... acquires value 'as the result of organization
and the expenditure of labor, skill, and money' by an entity, that entity constitutionally may obtain a
limited property right in the word .... Gay Olympics, 483 U.S. 522, 532 (1987) (citing International
News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 239 (1918))); Id. at 2554 (quoting Justice Fortas'
dissent in Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 615-17 (1969)("A flag may be property...")); Id. at
2555 (quotingJustice White's concurrence in Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 587 (1974)("The flag
is itself a monument.")).
56 315 U.S. 568 (1942); seeJohnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2552-53.
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of real property-the Washington Monument 5 7-and this image has
been picked up by those who support congressional action to reverse the
Court's disposition.58
The fallacies in the right/value theory can be revealed in a number
of ways, not the least of which is that the choice for assigning surplus
value is not between a trademark owner and a trademark user-Mattel
and BVD-but between trademark owners and the public-Mattel and
tee-shirt consumers. If Mattel is given (through trademark law or an-
other legal regime) the right to exclude others from selling "Barbie" tee
shirts, then it can indeed charge a premium over the cost of manufactur-
ing the shirt, which will be paid by those purchasers who value the prod-
uct at or above the set price. If, on the other hand, no one has an
exclusive right to use the word on a shirt, a supracompetitive price will
presumably attract rivals, who will compete it down to cost. In that
event, the surplus value will go not to BVD or to Mattel, but to purchas-
ers. Since it is they who found uses for "Barbie" in excess of signaling,
this does not seem like a case in which parties reap that which they have
-not sown.
To put this in a larger context, public goods can usually be made
into exclusive property by operation of law; the issue in such cases is
whether there is a justification for giving private parties wealth that
would otherwise accrue to those who use the goods. Outside the signal-
ing context (where trademark rights are protected), increasing the pool
of word utilizers does not impose costs on prior users in the way that,
say, adding cattle to a pasture detracts from its ability to maintain the
first farmer's herd.59 Accordingly, and contrary to the dissents' implica-
tion in Johnson, the rationale that supports exclusive rights in real prop-
erty has no application here.
It is also an overstatement to equate rights in trademarks with rights
in other intellectual property, which was part of the strategy in Gay Olym-
pics. As noted, that opinion sought to justify protection for the USOC by
arguing that the public benefits from the diversion of surplus value to
quality enhancing activity. This language sounds similar to the claims
that patent profits support innovation 60 and that copyright royalties sub-
sidize authorship. 6 1 It is also analogous to the rationales used in two
common law intellectual property cases that were cited in Gay Olympics,
International News Service v. Associated Press ("INS"),62 which endorsed a
right against misappropriation of news stories, and Zacchini v. Scripps-
57 Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2556.
58 See, e.g., 135 Cong. Rec. S12598 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1989)(statement of Sen. Mitchell); id. at
S12600 (statement of Sen. Gramm); id. at S12616 (statement of Sen. Wilson); Buckley, The Court and
The Flag Decision, 41 NAT'L REV. 54 (Aug. 4, 1989).
59 Cf Landes & Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30J. L. & ECON. 265, 267 (1987);
R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 27-31 (2d ed. 1977).
60 See, e.g., Dreyfuss, Dethroning Lear: Licensee Estoppel and the Incentive to Innovate, 72 VA. L. REV.
677, 679-80 (1986).
61 See, e.g., Dreyfuss, The Creative Employee and the Copyright Act of 1976, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 590,
628-30 (1987).
62 248 U.S. 215 (1918) [hereinafter INS]. This citation was especially interesting because the
continued vitality of its misappropriation theory had been subject to considerable debate, see, e.g.,
Baird, Common Law Intellectual Property and the Legacy of International News Service v. Associated Press,
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Howard Broadcasting Co. ,63 the "human cannonball" case, which upheld
the right of publicity against a first amendment challenge. 64
One problem with analogizing rights in trademarks to rights in other
intellectual property can be seen when comparing the product for which
exclusivity is sought with the business of its creator. In patent, copyright,
misappropriation, and publicity, the law protects the one and only prod-
uct that the creator has for sale: the invention, the book, the news story,
or the spectacle. If the creator cannot reap a profit from that product,
then there is nothing upon which to base a source of pecuniary return.
Exclusivity is therefore necessary to assure the creator freedom from
those who did not make the creative effort and thus would undercut the
price at which the creator could profitably sell the work.65 In contrast,
the owner of a trademark is really in the business of selling a different
product-dolls in the case of Mattel. The profit and the incentive to en-
hance quality comes from the marketing success of this other product,
not the trademark. Exclusivity in the trademark is only needed to point
consumers in the right direction, and that function is preserved by pro-
tecting the mark's signaling function.
Indeed, it is somewhat perverse to encourage the trademark owner's
primary activity by facilitating the capture of profits from some other
good. In the case of other intellectual property rights, the choice of ex-
clusivity as an incentive mechanism is at least partially justified by the
notion that the values captured provide the optimal amount of incentive
to produce works of a similar nature in the future.66 But the public may
enjoy the expressive dimensions of a trademark more than it values the
underlying product. If so, diverting surplus value to activity in the prod-
uct field would lead to over-stimulation of investment in the product.
Even if the public does value trademarks enough to care whether the
economy provides enough motivation to produce them, it is not clear
50 U. CHi. L. REV. 411 (1983); Product Simulation: A Right or Wrong, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1178
(1964)(Leeds, Handler, Derenberg, Brown, and Bender, contributors).
63 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
64 Gay Olympics, 483 U.S. at 532-33. INS involved the right of the International News Service to
enjoin the Associated Press from taking uncopyrighted news stories that INS transmitted to the east
coast and retransmitting them to AP subscribers on the west coast. In holding for INS, the Court
reasoned that a right against misappropriation was necessary to make profitable an investment in
newsgathering, an activity from which the public benefits. 248 U.S. at 24 1. The Court also invoked
the reaping and sowing metaphor alluded to earlier. Id. at 239. Similarly in Zacchini, the Court
reasoned that the human cannonball could protect his act from unauthorized rebroadcast on the
theory that a right of publicity would encourage a creator "to make the investment required to pro-
duce a [work] of interest to the public." 433 U.S. at 576.
65 Because the right of publicity as endorsed in Zacchini has this special property of protecting
work product, the case must be distinguished from publicity cases that protect other aspects of a
celebrity's personhood. See, e.g., Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 90 Wis. 2d 379, 280 N.W.2d
129 (1979) (protecting football player's nickname).
66 In theory, the price of creative works depends on demand. Accordingly, high demand would
create high profits, which would mean public satisfaction would translate into greater remuneration
to those who produce like works. In practice, it is often the case that demand for the work measures
its value imperfectly, see, e.g., Dreyfuss, supra note 61 (citing as obstacles the limited duration of
copyright, the inability of copyright holders to price discriminate, and the inability of users to cor-
rectly evaluate works before they have consumed them). Furthermore, creativity may not be as pre-
dictable as other endeavors. Nonetheless, copyright and patent law are premised on the notion that
the market is the best mechanism yet devised to spur creativity. See also Wright, The Economics of
Invention Incentives: Patents, Prizes and Research Contracts, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 691 (1983).
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that surplus value protection is necessary. The exigencies of the market-
place require its participants to develop signals in order to differentiate
their goods from those of their rivals. Nice symbols are more likely to be
produced than displeasing ones because the more agreeable the signal,
the more easily it will be remembered, and the better the product will
sell.67
The fallacies in the real property and intellectual property analogies
are unsatisfying from more than a theoretical point of view; they have
direct impact on the manner in which benefits are distributed as between
right-holders and the public. For the traditional rights, this allocation is
achieved by asking the question, how much exclusivity is necessary to
accomplish the desired goals? Once these goals are realized, surplus can
be diverted to consumers. This is not to say it is always easy to find the
best balance between access and reward: for the statutory rights, alloca-
tion is accomplished somewhat arbitrarily68 by legislative fiat;69 for com-
mon law rights, case-by-case analysis often leads to unsatisfactory results
in individual cases. But although disagreements will be inevitable, the
justifications for these rights do provide a framework that makes a discus-
sion of the balance possible.
These quasi-trademark claims stand in sharp contrast. By equating
"value" with "right," the decisions fail to create an internal reference
point against which to measure the need for exclusivity.70 Instead of ask-
ing a question about how much value the creator needs in order to be
optimally motivated, this right simply asks whether value, for every diver-
sion of value is, by definition, too much. Thus, the problems engendered
by expanding proprietary rights exist not only for the paradigm cases
involving surplus value, but for all other hybrid usages. Furthermore,
the rights created apparently endure forever; enforcement decisions are
devoid of reference to the illicit motives of other users, to the potential
harm to the complainant's activities, or to the inability of the complainant
to receive an adequate return on investment. 71 Nor is there room, as
67 I do not, however, fully agree with Landes and Posner, supra note 59, at 273, who claim that
trademarks should not be fully protected because words are easily and cheaply created. If anything,
this argument cuts in the opposite direction: if words are cheap, little is lost in giving trademark
owners plenary control.
68 Thus, for example, there has never been an adequate explanation of the 17-year duration of
utility patents, see Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97 HARv. L. REV. 1813, 1823-
29 (1984). Nor is there a clear reason why Congress chose not to accord public performance rights
to the copyright holder of sound recordings, 17 U.S.C § 114(a) (1988), or excepted only sound
recordings of musical works from the first-sale doctrine. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (1988) (first-sale doc-
trine). Id. at § 109(b) (exception).
69 Through, for example, duration limitations and compulsory license provisions.
70 To a significant extent, much the same can be said for the right of publicity recognized in
Zacchini. Although the Court was faced in that case with a first amendment-i.e. public access-
challenge to the right of publicity, Scripps-Howard's claim was so diffuse that it failed to alert the
Court to the dangers of simply equating rights of publicity with copyright. Thus, the Court failed to
grapple with the fact that copyright law contains inherent limitations (such as duration, fair use, and
compulsory licensing provisions) that protect the public, while rights of publicity do not. This has
left the states to deal with the problems presented by a theoretically perpetual right that could se-
verely limit the ability of the public to effectively discuss the lives and works of others. Cf Ropski &
Marschang, The Stars' Wars: Names, Pictures and Lookalikes, 17 AIPLA QJ. 81, 99 (1989).
71 Cf Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 109 S.Ct.
326 (1988), in which the court enjoined, over first amendment challange, the distribution of items
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there is in copyright and traditional trademark law, to compare the pub-
lic's need to put the protected work to a particular use with the right
holder's claim for control. 72
As a result of abandoning the theoretical structure of trademark law,
and instead building on faulty analogies to real property and other intel-
lectual property regimes, courts have been left with the task of balancing
public and private interests under the framework of the first amendment.
But this has proved to be a troublesome proposition. Because traditional
trademark law averted collision with free speech interests by reserving
rights to contexts in which consumers might be confused and by shaping
doctrines that aggressively protect the free use of marks outside the sig-
naling context,73 there is meager precedent on which to rely.74
Gay Olympics is a case in point. Like most courts entertaining free
speech claims, the Supreme Court attempted to invoke the concepts of
deception and commercialism as touchstones for deciding when speech
can be regulated. 75 Both references proved unavailing. Once the Court
found that the USOC had authority to control its marks even in the ab-
sence of confusion, speech that was by definition nondeceptive came
under the control of the trademark owner.76 The Court then attempted
to justify the expressive restriction that this represented on the ground
that SFAA's use was commercial, and therefore entitled to only "a lim-
ited form of First Amendment protection," 77 but this reasoning protects
marked with a feather-bonneted, emaciated head and the terms, "Mutant of Omaha" and "Nuclear
Holocaust Insurance"; the dissent noted the thinness of the evidence on the likelihood of confusion.
Id. at 403.
72 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988) (fair use provision in copyright law) and 15 U.S.C.
§ 11 15(b)(4) (1988) (fair use provision of federal trademark law). For example, the Gay Olympics
Court had actually been asked to address the contention that the fair use defense of the Lanham Act
should apply to enforcment decisions under the Amateur Sports Act, but it failed to do so. Instead,
it merely noted that the Lanham Act was meant to provide the USOC with greater exclusivity than
that given trademark owners. But since other provisions of the two acts differed-e.g., in imposing a
requirement of demonstrating consumer confusion-this was hardly an adequate treatment of the
question.
Ironically, some balancing is made even with respect to real property, in which the claim for
exclusivity is perhaps at its zenith, see, e.g., D. DOBBS, R. KEETON, & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON
ON TORTS, 145-48 (5th ed. 1984) (defense of necessity); Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447
U.S. 74 (1980) (first amendment interest).
73 See, e.g., Stop the Olympic Prison v. United States Olympic Comm., 489 F. Supp. 1112
(S.D.N.Y. 1980); Reddy Communications, Inc. v. Environmental Action Found., 477 F. Supp. 936
(D.D.C. 1979).
74 Cliff's Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publishing Group, 718 F. Supp. 1159 (S.D.N.Y.
1989), vacated, 886 F.2d 490 (2d Cir. 1989), is an example of the problem. In that case, the district
court preliminarily enjoined the defendant from publishing "Spy Notes," a parody on plaintiff's
study guides. Reasoning that trademark laws "contribute to a favorable climate for expression by
complementing the economic incentive that copyright law provides to create and disseminate artistic
works," 718 F. Supp. at 1162 (citing Silverman v. CBS, Inc., 870 F.2d 40, 48 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
109 S.Ct. 3219 (1989)), the district court had searched for a way to balance the newly-created right
of the plaintiff against first amendment concerns. 718 F. Supp. at 1162-64. It settled on a likelihood
of confusion test, id. at 1519-22, which accords rather poorly with the rationale for creating the right
in the first place. On appeal, the Second Circuit approved a similar approach, but looked also at
"the primary intent" of the second user-and reversed. See also Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994
(2d Cir. 1989).
75 See Gay Olympics, 483 U.S. at 535 n.12 (1987) (deception). Id. at 535-39 (commercialism).
76 Id. at 530.
77 Id. at 535 (citing Posadas de Puerto Rico Ass'n v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328,
340 (1986)).
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access in only a narrow category of cases and is, in any event, unpersua-
sive. After all, the essence of a hybrid case is that a trademark is being
used as both a signal-that is, in commerce-and as expression. Accord-
ingly, except in the rare instance in which there is no attempt to capture
the surplus, the first amendment will not release trademarks for rhetori-
cal purposes. A public-interest group's use of "Star Wars" may pass
muster,78 but even public-interest groups sometimes support their activi-
ties through sales of items bearing their slogans.7 9 Furthermore, some
passages in the Court's opinion judge commercialism by the effect of
SFAA's activities on the USOC rather than by analyzing what SFAA was
itself doing. 0 With an impact standard such as this, the first amendment
might not even shield the use of marks in editorials, if the material can be
interpreted as critical of the trademark owner. 8'
Even if the Court's label of commercialism is accepted, its reasoning
is unpersuasive. Commercial speech does receive a limited form of first
amendment protection, and the Court might have explicitly considered
the form that such protection should take in the context of word usage.
Instead, however, the Court invoked the same fallacious real property
analogy that it used to define the scope of the USOC's right in the first
place: it found the intrusion acceptable as a time, place or manner
restriction.8 2
78 Lucasfilm, Ltd. v. High Frontier, 622 F. Supp. 931 (D.D.C. 1985).
79 See, e.g., Stop the Olympic Prison v. United States Olympic Comm., 489 F. Supp. 1112
(S.D.N.Y. 1980), in which a court allowed a group called STOP to sell posters using the words "Stop
the Olympic Committee" and the five rings in order to raise money to protest the conversion of the
Olympic Village in Lake Placid into a prison. Although the Court cited this case, see Gay Olympics, 483
U.S. at 536 n.14, as an example of an expressive use of the term Olympic that has been upheld, it is
difficult to see how the case could come out the same now. The district court refused to find the use
barred by the Amateur Sports Act, holding that "only a relative few [posters] were sold by the
[group], and the money paid for each appears to have been more in the nature of a contribution...
than a purchase price." 489 F. Supp. at 1121. Under Gay Olympics, however, sale of the posters may
have been enough to classify the activity as commercial, and therefore actionable. See also Reddy
Communications, Inc. v. Environmental Action Found., 477 F. Supp. 936, 941 (D.D.C. 1979)(public
interest group sold to the public "books and magazines wherein caricatures of Reddy appear") (de-
cided on a no-confusion rationale).
80 Gay Olympics, 483 U.S. at 539 (describing SFAA as seeking to "exploit the 'commercial mag-
netism' of the word given value by the USOC"). See also Kravitz, supra note 46, at 173-77 (noting
other differences between the way that the Court analyzed the commercialism issue in this case and
in other first amendment cases).
81 See, e.g., L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26 (1st Cir.)(refusing to enjoin
publication of a sexually explicit parody of the L.L. Bean catalogue on the ground that the first
amendment protected editorialization), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1013 (1987).
82 Gay Olympics, 483 U.S. at 536 (Act merely regulates "the manner in which the SFAA may
convey its message"). The Court also justified the restriction on speech as supported by a "substan-
tial governmental interest." Id. at 537. In the context of the Gay Olympics case, and perhaps other
trademark usage cases, this justification is also unpersuasive. First, according to the Court's own
analysis, the party whose interests are furthered is in no sense a governmental entity. Id. at 542-47
(rejecting the claim that the USOC is subject to the Equal Protection Clause on the ground that the
the state action requirement had not been met). Second, the kinds of interests that the Court ac-
cepts as justifications are generally more compelling than a national desire to promote amateur ath-
letics. Thus, the Court cited United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), a case so unlike Gay
Olympics that it is difficult to think of a more farfetched analogy. 483 U.S. at 537. It concerned a
draft card burning; the government interest at stake there-military readiness-is so strong that the
Court generally declines to weigh it against any liberty interest. See, e.g., Goldman v. Weinberger,
475 U.S. 503, 508 (1986) (citing Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 181, 187
(1962)). Finally, the substantial-interest test usually requires a finding that there is a good fit be-
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The time-place-or-manner idea is not, however, a congenial way in
which to think about words. This designation is sometimes useful to dif-
ferentiate between regulations that are constitutional because they are
aimed at "some danger beyond the speech,"83 and those that are prob-
lematic because they are intended to minimize dangers posed by the con-
tent of speech. It is, however, difficult to see how that categorization is
relevant to the question of controlling linguistic usage. The restraint at
issue is, in some sense, viewpoint neutral, but it is aimed precisely at the
content of speech, and not at some problem, such as noise or litter-
problems afflicting property, not words-that occur as a byproduct of
speech. 84
More important, the acceptability of time, place or manner restric-
tions posit the existence of other times, places, and manners in which the
message can be conveyed. Yet the essence of the first amendment claim
is that there are instances in which the loss of vocabulary is, effectively,
the loss of the ability to communicate. The Court never fully analyzed
the acceptability of the alternative it offered SFAA, and thus never con-
sidered the efficacy question. The next section takes up this issue. After
comparing SFAA's original message with the one sent by the Court, this
Part surveys the linguistic literature to demonstrate that SFAA's predica-
ment was not unique. It then attempts to develop limits to the reach of
these new proprietary interests by creating an expressive analogue to
those doctrines of trademark law that protect public access.
II. Cabining the Trend: A Linguistic Approach
The Gay Olympics case is a good context in which to consider the
connection between the vehicles of speech and the efficacy of communi-
cation because in claiming that the word "Olympic" was generic and
available to all, SFAA essentially made the argument that the loss of the
ability to use "Olympic" was effectively suppression of its speech.
Although somewhat opaque on this point,8 5 the Court managed to duck
the constitutional issue. Instead, it held that since "Gay Games" in-
formed potential customers that tickets would entitle them to view ath-
tween the interest protected and the restraint. See, e.g., Posadas de Puerto Rico Assoc. v. Tourism
Co., 478 U.S. 328, 340 (1986)("the speech may by restricted only if the government's interests in
doing so is substantial, the restrictions directly advance the government's asserted interest, and the
restrictions are no more extensive than necessary to serve that interest."). Cf Perry Educ. Ass'n v.
Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)(requiring a tight fit between the restriction and
"a compelling state interest"). Here there is no fit at all, for the concern for promoting amateur
athletics is not a goal that inherently requires any restrictions on speech. For example, since the
profit that the USOC makes on its marks is unrelated to the benefit the organization is thought to
bestow, the government could have equally well subsidized the USOC's activities or granted an ex-
traordinary tax deduction to contributions to them. And even if it were thought indispensable for
the USOC to raise money through the marketing of its ideograms, it may have been possible to
award it words that have less expressive content than the 2000-year old phrases of ancient Greece.
83 L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 794 (2d ed. 1988).
84 See, e.g., Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941) (parades). See also Texas v.Johnson, 109
S. Ct. 2533, 2540-42 (1989).
85 See supra note 40.
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letic competitions, that term was an adequate substitute for the
challenged mark, "Gay Olympic Games." 8 6
In fact, this substitution is highly inadequate. SFAA was not an im-
presario of sporting events, similar in function and purpose to the NBA,
NFL, or PGA. Rather, a nonprofit corporation organized under Califor-
nia law, its mission was to educate the public about homosexuality, to
portray it positively, to provide recreation-for homosexuals, and to create
a climate of friendship and cooperation among people of all sexual pref-
erences.8 7 To further that goal by demonstrating that gay people are as
athletic as anyone else, SFAA created a series of competitive sporting
events. To recall the tenets of the ancient Greeks and to evoke their
spirit of cooperation, mutual acceptance, and international friendship, it
called the tournament the "Gay Olympic Games." 8 8 While the events
could easily be called "Gay Games," that title conveys none of this* his-
tory and elicits none of these associations. Thus, no matter how success-
ful "Gay Games" were in the marketplace of athletic events, it is doubtful
that a society accustomed to receiving information in easily swallowed
"sound bites" fully appreciated the message that SFAA was trying to in-
terject into the marketplace of ideas.
It is not only ironic that in a case about communication, the Court
managed to misinterpret the message that SFAA was attempting to con-
vey. In translating "Olympic" as "game" and missing the rich set of con-
notations that surround the former expression, the Court illustrated just
how much words and their paraphrases differ. There is an open texture
to certain words that makes them much more than "a short cut from
mind to mind." 89 This openness comes, in part, from the fact that some
words have core denotations (definitions that can be found in a diction-
ary), and a set of connotations that depend upon their history, deriva-
tion, and identification with users. 90 These peripheral meanings are
often highly individualized to the speaker, the listener, and possibly to
the method by which they interact or perceive one another. 91 When such
words are used, they become infused with the listener's own associations,
and their message is incorporated into the listener's own frame of refer-
ence. The result is that the expression as perceived can have much
86 Gay Olympics, 483 U.S. at 532-35.
87 Id. at 535 n.13.
88 As planned by the SFAA, the events were similar in format to the Olympic games that were
held in Greece 2000 years ago, as revived in the current era. Gay Olympics-, 483 U.S. at 533 nn.9 & 10.
They were to feature a series of athletic competitions taking place over a several-day period, and
were to be held every four years in different locations around the world. Athletes from many nations
would be invited to compete for gold, silver, and bronze medals. Each event would begin with a
torch relay and a parade of uniformed athletes divided by city. For a comparison between the an-
cient games and those run by the USOC and SFAA, see id. at 540 n.18.
89 Texas v.Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 2539 (1989) (quoting West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Bar-
nette, 319 U.S. 624, 632 (1943)).
90 R. HALL, JR., INrRODUCTORY LINGUisTics 232-35 (1964). For example, consider whether a
sentence using "thou" would have the same effect as one substituting "you;" if "pudding" is a per-
fect substitute for "dessert." Cf Ross, U and Non-U: An Essay in Sociological Linguistics, in THE IMPOR-
TANCE OF LANGUAGE 91, 102-03 (M. Black ed. 1962) (giving, among many other examples, use of the
words "serviette" instead of "napkin" and "raincoat" instead of "burberry" as a method for distin-
guishing between lower- and upper-class britons).
91 R. JAKOBSON & M. HALLE, supra note 15, at 76.
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greater impact on the recipient's thinking than the words that were actu-
ally transmitted. 92
Studies of cognition reveal that words can be open-textured in a
stronger sense as well. Because words sometimes have several core
meanings, particular usages can require listeners to consider several de-
notations, their respective connotations, and the connections between
them.93 This effort can lead to a new level of understanding, which
might not have been achieved by words lacking the same associational
set. Nor would these insights be produced by an expanded statement of
meaning because a paraphrase of a word, like a paraphrase of any other
metaphor,94 closes the set of associations and constrains the field of con-
nections that are necessary to the expansion of perception. 95
Paradoxically, words can advance understanding not only by
splintering and juxtaposing associations, but also by crystallizing the re-
lationship between diverse experiences. 96 For example, the early stage
of scientific inquiry can be understood as a process of proposing nominal
definitions, which are expressions naming concepts and defining the cri-
teria for deciding when the concepts apply. The defined terms are then
utilized in higher level manipulation, such as ordering, empirical testing,
and, ultimately, the formulation of theoretical constructs. 97 Although it
is the empirical import of these constructs-their explanatory and pre-
dictive capacity-that is the essence of scientific advance, 98 it is the defi-
nitional and classification procedure that enables scientists to find the
correlations between observables that makes theorizing possible.99
Linguists understand the role that specific words play in structuring
thought and organizing experience. They observe the phenomenon de-
scribed above as reflected in the correlation between language patterns
and theoretical constructs, 10 0 and also the rapidity with which cultures
devise words to fit new conceptualizations. 10 Were the relationship be-
92 See, e.g., Lakoff & Johnson, The Metaphorical Structure of the Human Conceptual System, 4 COGNI-
TIVE SCIENCE 195 (1980). See also M. EDELMAN, POLITICAL LANGUAGE (1977).
93 See, e.g., 0. AKHMANOVA, supra note 15, at 36-49; R. HALL, supra note 90, at 231.
94 R. HALL, supra note 90, at 350 (giving the example of use of the Latin word for breath (spir-
itus) to convey the then-emerging notion of the spirit).
95 Davidson, What Metaphors Mean, 5 CRITICAL INQUIRY 31 (1978). See also M. EDELMAN, supra
note 92, at 23-26 ("classification evokes beliefs and perceptions that we normally accept uncritically,
precisely because they are generated subtly by the terms used to designate them.").
96 R. HALL, supra note 90, at 400-02.
97 C. HEMPEL, FUNDAMENTALS OF CONCEPT FORMATION IN EMPIRICAL SCIENCE (1952).
98 Id. at 47.
99 Id. at 1-2 ("concept formation and theory formation in science are so closely interrelated as to
constitute virtually two different aspects of the same procedure"). See also M. EDELMAN, supra note
92, at 58.
An example may be helpful. The doctor that sees patients losing weight, acting tired, and con-
tracting pneumonia and esoteric cancers will treat these conditions as effectively as possible. But the
doctor who recognizes that these conditions often appear together, would create a classification and
name it. Once the classification has been identified-"AIDS"--causes can be postulated and cures
developed.
100 R. HALL, supra note 90, at 400-02 (citing the connection between Aristotle's categories of
perception and Greek grammar).
101 G. CANNON, supra note 8, at 1-28; R. HALL, supra note 90, at 284, 348. Such words come from
a variety of sources: other languages, dead languages, or other contexts. Sometimes such words are
coined.
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tween a word and its paraphrase merely a short cut, language groups
could afford to take time developing words to suit new needs. Instead,
even the French, who zealously guard linguistic integrity, are quick to fill
empty vocabulary slots, even if that requires borrowing phrases from
other languages.10 2
Similarly, physicians who treat aphasia, the loss of language, find
that it is a more profound disorder than muteness, the loss of speech.
The inability of aphasics to comprehend particular words interferes with
the operations that they need to think.'0 3 A grasp of literal meaning is
not helpful, as cognition is often mediated by the metaphorical character
of words, which provoke comparisons between phenomena, or by their
metonymic significance, which induce understanding of the whole of a
phenomenon from consideration of a part of it.104 Thus, it is not only
that technology has shortened attention span to the point where only
messages packaged into "sound bites" are heard, though that phenome-
non is certainly important to consider when contemplating claims to indi-
vidual words.' 0 5 It may well be the case that the human intellect is
constructed such that it is the density with which information is packed
that is critical. If densely packed units-words infused with sets of deno-
tations and associated connotations-are processed more readily than
longer, less concentrated linguistic segments, loss of words can, in a very
real sense, be equated with loss of the ability to communicate. 0 6
Of course, even if the connection between words and thought is con-
ceded, it could be argued that no particular word is essential to commu-
nication, as the process of nominal definition could be utilized to induce
a shift in concept identifiers. So, for example, if SFAA felt that not
102 R. BIDoIs, LES MOTS TROMPEURS (1970) (discussing incorporation of English into French
vocabulary).
103 R.JAKOBSON & M. HALLE, supra note 15, at 81-82 (citing Hemphil & Stengel, Pure Word Deaf-
ness, in 3J. NEUROLOGY AND PSYCHIATRY 251 (1940), for an aphasic patient's statement: "I can hear
you dead plain, but I cannot get what you say.... I hear your voice but not your words.... It does
not pronounce itself.").
104 R. JAKOBSON & M. HALLE, supra note 15, at 83. Several of the quotations that began this
Article use trademarks metaphorically, but the qualities of trademarked goods are so well under-
stood in the culture that metonymic use can be even more powerful. Consider, for example, Joyce
Maynard's description of one of her characters: "Nona was very tiny and doll-like. She wore Villager
skirts and Lady Manhattan blouses with only the top button undone and wrote to her parents twice a
week." J. MAYNARD, BABY LOVE 25 (1981).
105 Cf Election '88: The Media Aftermath, 115 BROADCASTING, No. 20, at 35 (Nov. 14, 1988) ("As for
the campaign, it had been one of sound bites and visuals and events staged for impact on the eve-
ning news-Vice President George Bush in a flag factory and Governor Michael Dukakis careening
around a proving ground in a tank were among the more notable."); Nyhan, The Dukakis Demonizing
That Has Taken Hold, Boston Globe, Nov. 1, 1988, at 13 ("You gotta have 'sound bites.' You're
judged on the impact of your TV spots, no matter how slimy, untruthful or mean-spirited or racist
they might be."). See also Tackett, Losers Weep Briefly, Then Start Fight Over, Chicago Tribune, July 4,
1989, at 5; Clark, Frenzy in the Tawana Brawley Case, Two Reporters Became the Story by Scooping the Pack,
Chicago Tribune, June 4, 1989, at I.
106 Cf Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25-26 (197 1)("[W]e cannot overlook the fact, because it
is well illustrated by the episode involved here, that much linguistic expression serves a dual commu-
nicative function: it conveys not only ideas capable of relatively precise, detached explication, but
otherwise inexpressible emotions as well. In fact, words are often chosen as much for their emotive
as their cognitive force. We cannot sanction the view that the Constitution, while solicitous of the
cognitive content of individual speech, has little or no regard for that emotive function which, practi-
cally speaking, may often be the more important element of the overall message sought to be
communicated.").
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enough meaning were packed into "Gay Games," it could redefine the
idea of cooperation, acceptance, international friendship, and competi-
tion by announcing, "let 'Grekko' stand for 'Olympic.'" Calling the
sporting events "Gay Grekko Games" would then have as much impact
as the title that utilized "Olympic." Since this process demands some
use of the trademark, accepting it would require recognition of a limited
form of fair use (a sort of definitional use), but trademark owners like the
USOC would be fully protected without sacrificing expressive
concerns. 1
0 7
The difficulty with such a procedure is that words do not become
part of the effective language as easily as this process would require. At
any given time, speakers experiment with a wide variety of sound groups
(phonemes), but only a small number of these potential words actually
enter the vocabulary. l0 8 Although linguists have not developed a com-
plete theory for predicting which sounds become words, the innovations
that are successful tend to share certain traits. They are made up of
sound clusters that are euphonious, readily pronounced, easily inflected,
and accommodate well to grammatical rules. Either because there are a
large number of initial users or because the phonemes contain internal
cues, the meaning of successful words are quickly grasped. They are in-
troduced by prestigious speakers whom others wish to emulate, or by
speakers who are mobile enough to spread the new word efficiently. 10 9
Not every group of phonemes meets the first set of requirements; finding
ones that do can be expensive, especially if the word is to enter more
than one language."10 Added to this is the cost of educating the right
seed group so that the new word and its meaning spread to others.
Since the process of producing a word is expensive, the real ques-
tion in requiring substitution through nominal definition is, who should
pay the cost. As between members of the public (such as SFAA) who
wish to use trademarks expressively and trademark owners (such as the
USOC), the latter appears to be the superior choice. First, the cost of
developing perfect synonyms for marks could be considered part of the
quid pro quo for acquiring control over them. It is, in contrast, difficult
to see how a single expressive user could capture enough of the benefits
of a new word to compensate for the cost of developing it. Although this
user could ask for contributions from the public, which would also bene-
fit from the naming of new conceptualizations, the transaction costs in-
volved in such an enterprise are likely to be prohibitive. Second,
trademark owners are already in the business of developing words and
advertising their meaning. The marginal cost of developing two words
for the same concept is surely lower than the cost that a member of the
107 The constitutional necessity of a fair use defense remains an open question after Gay Olympics.
Although the Court found that the Amateur Sports Act did not incorporate the defenses of the
Lanham Act, Gay Olympics, 483 U.S. 522, 531 (1987), it failed to consider whether fair use was consti-
tutionally required.
108 Thus, for example, people's ages can be estimated according to the slang that they use, since
some words, such as "23-skidoo" and "gung-ho" having been unsuccessful at spreading into the
general vocabulary of English speakers. See R. HALL, supra note 90, at 235.
109 See G. CANNON, supra note 8, at 3-4, 235 n.2, 273-74; R. HALL, supra note 90, at 256, 283-86.
110 R. BIDOIS, supra note 102, at 67.
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public would incur in creating only one word. Moreover, words are most
readily adopted into language when they fill conceptual voids;' I I indeed,
most trademarks that have passed into the language have done so pre-
cisely because there was no other word to describe the product they sig-
nified.112 Since trademark owners control timing, they are in the best
position to exploit the window of opportunity provided by the existence
of empty language slots.
In fact, the notion of imposing this duty on trademark owners is not
new, for the doctrine of genericity works exactly this way. It protects the
efficacy of communication by recognizing the public's need for a trade-
mark that becomes the common signifier for the set to which the product
on which it appears belongs. Such marks are considered generic, and a
successful demonstration of genericity is a defense to infringement ac-
tions.' 13 Not only does the doctrine protect public access to important
words, it has a significant side effect. An owner that does not wish to lose
its mark will often introduce a second word, which it educates the public
to use for the category. The trademark itself can then retain its role as a
signal. Thus, General Foods has successfully promoted the term "decaf-
feinated coffee" to protect "Sanka" from genericization and Xerox is cur-
rently working on public acceptance for "photocopy." As a result of
these efforts, the public obtains more than just a few new words: it ac-
quires the vehicles necessary to formulate questions about whether
Sanka is the best decaffeinated coffee, or Xerox the best photocopier.
Indeed, SFAA had suggested precisely this approach in Gay Olympics.' 14
Had it been successful, the Court's declaration that the 2000-year old
Greek word was generic would have forced Congress to release
"Olympic" to the public and to emulate General Foods and Xerox by
developing a second series of terms for the USOC to sell.
But SFAA's failure to convince the Court of the genericity of
"Olympic" may hold the key to resolving the problem of public access to
marks in a legal regime intent on expanding proprietary rights. Thus,
the explanation for the Court's willingness to accept "garmes" as a substi-
tute for "Olympic" may lie in the fact that it compartmentalized the vo-
cabulary into expressive and competitive components. Since it took the
genericity defense solely in its traditional form, as a claim about the com-
petitive vocabulary, it evaluated the word in only the competitive context,
as a word denoting athletic tournaments, and came to the conclusion that
ample synonyms were readily available. Had it instead focused on the
expressive significance of "Olympic," and looked for replacements that
would evoke the tenets of the ancient Greeks, it might have reached a
different result on the genericity issue.
If the Court's ability to compartmentalize vocabulary and under-
stand language contextually is a universal facility-and linguistic research
111 R. HALL, supra note 90, at 284 (citing the definitional tradition in science); R. BIDOIS, supra
note 102, at 69 (citing development of terms for imported goods).
112 Examples include aspirin, cellophane, shredded wheat, and linoleum.
113 See, e.g., DuPont Cellophane Co. v. Waxed Prods. Co., 85 F.2d 75, 80 (2d Cir. 1936); cf Lan-
ham Act § 14(3), 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3) (1988).
114 Gay Olympics, 483 U.S. 522, 532-35 (1987).
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indicates that it isl' 5-then trademark law could be altered with this ca-
pacity in mind. Thus, it should be possible to build upon the defenses
that trademark law has constructed for the competitive vocabulary a par-
allel set of principles to protect expressive speech. In a regime that rec-
ognized the facility to compartmentalize, signaling functions would be
analysed according to the conventional Polaroid principles, and the newly
developed doctrines would operate to allocate rights when trademarks
are used expressively. Proprietary rights to marks would then be pro-
tected across the entire signaling spectrum, except in instances in which
expressive communication was suppressed by the loss of vocabulary.
Reliance on traditional trademark principles as a framework for ex-
pressive speech may appear incongruous in view of the remarks made
earlier about the dissonance between the justifications for trademark
protection and the motivation that has led to the recognition of rights in
hybrid cases. However, trademark law has several properties that make it
a useful place to begin developing a jurisprudence that can analyze
claims to the expressive vocabulary. This branch of the law is one of the
only areas in which the problem of words, as distinguished from ideas,
has received systematic analysis. The lack of cases at the antitrust/trade-
mark and first amendment/trademark interface is some indication that
the structure it has developed ably protects communicative efficiency
within the marketplace of commerce. Accordingly, it holds some prom-
ise for the marketplace of ideas. Furthermore, its method of analysis has
managed to avoid the need to decide which of its elements are constitu-
tionally compelled." 16 In light of the difficulty in deciding when "sym-
bols [are] sufficiently special to warrant... unique status" under the first
amendment, 117 a prudentially-based scheme, whose doctrines act as a
buffer between proprietary and public claims, may be the wisest, and
only available avenue for fully safeguarding speech." 18
To provide protection to the expressive vocabulary that is equivalent
in range to that provided for competitive speech, the full array of trade-
mark defenses would have to be reconstructed, a task beyond the scope
of this Article. However, to demonstrate how this analysis would work,
the genericity defense discussed above can be used as an illustration. Its
expressive analogue would presumably look as follows: courts entertain-
ing hybrid use cases would first decide whether there is an expressive
component to the challenged use and then consider how central the
trademark is to the usage. If the mark is found to be rhetorically unique
within its context, it would be considered expressively-but not necessar-
ily competitively-generic, and the trademark owner would not be per-
mitted to suppress its utilization in that context."19
115 See, e.g., G. GILBERT & M. MULKAY, OPENING PANDORA'S Box: A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF
SCIENTISTS' DISCOURSE 6-7 (1984) (citing M. HALLIDAY, LANGUAGE AS SOCIAL SEMIOTIC 28-29, 32
(1978)).
116 In Gay Olympics, for example, the Court managed to avoid deciding whether either the doc-
trine of genericity or the defense of fair use was constitutionally required. See supra notes 85-86.
117 Texas v.Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 2546 (1989).
118 See Kravitz, supra note 46, at 170.
119 The notion that a word can be generic in some contexts but not others is also not new, see, e.g.,
Bayer v. United Drug Co., 272 F. Supp. 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1921), in which Judge Learned Hand found
[Vol. 65:397
EXPRESSIVE GENERICITY
This analysis would have several benefits. Courts are currently ex-
panding trademark owners' rights by finding more second uses confus-
ing, yet are forced to balance access interests against proprietary rights
under the same confusion rubric. 20 In contrast, the suggested analysis
would permit courts to drop the fiction of consumer confusion, and in-
stead focus on the primary concern, which is the expressive significance
of the mark. At the same time, this procedure would create an incentive
structure similar to the one operating within the competitive vocabulary.
Owners would think twice before they filled language slots with phrases
in which they have a proprietary interest. Alternatively, they would be
encouraged to contribute to the public domain a synonym for any new
conceptualizations that they identify.
As with competitive marks, the doctrine of genericity is easier to sug-
gest than to implement. The Gay Olympic Court's willingness to accept
the commercial success of "Gay Games" as indicative of the role played
by the word "Olympic" 21 demonstrates that it can be difficult to locate a
challenged use on the signaling spectrum. Identification of the user will,
however, often be a clue: public interest groups, such as SFAA, editorial
writers, such as newspapers and magazines, are more likely to be using a
mark expressively than those who are only in the business of marketing
posters or tee shirts. 122 Accordingly, while use by the latter might also
have expressive significance, their claim for access would require a
greater showing of unique need than that required by more purely ex-
pressive users. Thus, an entity that sells inexpensive items with clever
slogans might be prevented from parodying a trademark, even though
the same phrase might be accessible to a political action group.1 23 Intent
may also play an important role in deciding the expressiveness of the use.
For instance, a parody aimed at exposing a new idea would be consid-
ered more expressive than one designed solely to exploit the mark.1 24
More often, the difficult problem will be in gauging expressive sig-
nificance. The easier cases here will be the reference cases, those closest
"aspirin" generic as used by the public, but not as used by health professionals. Cf King-Seeley
Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Indus., Inc., 321 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1963) (finding thermos with a small 'T'
generic, but not if capitalized).
120 See, e.g., Cliff's Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publishing Group, Inc., 886 F.2d 490
(2d Cir. 1989) ("in deciding the reach of the Lanham Act in any case where an expressive work is
alleged to infringe a trademark, it is appropriate to weigh the public interest in free expression
against the public interest in avoiding consumer confusion").
121 483 U.S. 522, 536 (1987).
122 Compare, e.g., American Express Co. v. Vibra Approved Laboratories Corp., 10 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 2006 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)(enjoining distribution of a "condom card" using the slogan "Never
Leave Home Without It") and Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1183 (E.D.N.Y.
1972)(enjoining "Enjoy Cocaine" poster) with Cliff's Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publish-
ing Group, Inc., 886 F.2d 490 (2d Cir. 1989) (permitting Spy magazine parody of Cliff's Notes) and
Reddy Communications v. Environmental Action Found., 477 F. Supp. 936 (D.D.C. 1979)(permit-
ting environmental group to caricature "Reddy Kilowatt").
123 See, e.g., Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 402 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
109 S. Ct. 326 (1988) (enjoining a novelty-item manufacturer from parodying logo; leaving open
question whether the parody would be permissible in a "book, magazine, or film").
124 See, e.g., Cliff's Notes, Inc., 886 F.2d 490 (allowing greater latitude when "expression, and not
commercial exploitation of another's trademark, is the primary intent"; id. at 495 (quoting Dallas
Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 206-07 (2d Cir. 1979), as a
contrast).
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on the spectrum to Prestonnettes and Sanders, in which the trademark is
used to refer to the trademark owner. 125 Stop the Olympic Prison v. United
States Olympic Committee 126 is an example. There, the word "Olympic"
and the interlocking-ring logo were used on posters that were sold for
profit, 27 but the context of the use was a protest against the conversion
of Lake Placid's Olympic Village into a prison. Without the capacity to
direct the public's attention to this activity, it would not have been possi-
ble to mount an effective campaign against the USOC. Accordingly,
"Olympic" should be considered expressively generic when used in this
way.' 28 This analysis would also be applicable to political demonstra-
tions that utilize American flags. 129
Expressive requirements will not always be as clear as in these refer-
ence cases, but the method used for determining competitive genericity
can be tailored to identify expressive needs in more ambiguous contexts.
Instead of studying consumers through shopping mall intercepts and
other surveying techniques, which is the procedure in competitive cases,
the new inquiry would focus on speakers of the language through an ex-
amination of their written and oral communications-the technique, in
125 These uses could also be assimilated into a fair use doctrine, as was suggested in Note, supra
note 48, at 1099.
126 489 F. Supp. 1112 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aft'd, 636 F.2d 1204 (2d Cir. 1980). For facts of the case
see supra note 79.
127 Id. at 1121.
128 At one time, it would have been possible to use this analysis for the sports cases, which involve
unauthorized use of team logos on items like baseball caps, because proprietary control deprives the
public - fans - of the ability to express their identification with their teams. See, e.g., Boston Pro-
fessional Hockey Ass'n v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfrg., 510 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
868 (1975); Board of Gov. of Univ. of N.C. v. Helpingstine, 714 F. Supp. 167 (M.D.N.C. 1989);
Boston Professional Hockey Ass'n v. Reliable Knitting Works, Inc., 178 U.S.P.Q. 274 (E.D. Wis.
1973); National Football League Properties, Inc. v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc., 26 Il1. App. 3d
820, 327 N.E.2d 247 (1975); Denicola, supra note 27, at 168 n.43. But cf. International Order of
Job's Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 633 F.2d 912, 918 (9th Cir. 1980) (rejecting the rationale of
Boston Professional Hockey v. Dallas Cap & Emblem in the context of a club logo), cert. denied, 452
U.S. 941 (1981).
However, at this point, these cases should probably be considered lost causes: sports teams
have fully entered the merchandising market, see Eskanazi, supra note 1 (noting that like major league
teams, many colleges and universities have embarked on licensing schemes that earn considerable
profits). Accordingly, these entities can now use traditional trademark doctrine to prevent others
from using their works. But the road taken to create this business opportunity is instructive, for
expansion of trademark rights has, in these cases, demonstrably deprived the public of expressive
vehicles.
To reiterate a point made earlier: I remain unsympathetic to the claim that the surplus value in
these logos (as in any other trademarks) should be allocated to owners even if the profits from
increasing sales were demonstrably related to financial support that increased quality - and stand-
ings. If the sale of tickets and media rights were insufficient, owners eager for more could have
always tried to earn the competitive profits in logoed items, and have arranged for monopoly profits
in "genuine" team equipment and in items signed by the players.
129 It is useful to contrast the cases cited supra note 128 (sports cases), with cases like Vuitton Et
Fils S.A. v.J. Young Enters., Inc., 644 F.2d 769 (9th Cir. 1981), in which a claim was made that a
pattern created with Louis Vuitton's trademark could not be protected by trademark law because it
was "aesthetically functional." This concept, with which courts have struggled over the last decade,
was sometimes also applied in the sports cases. SeeJ.M. MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COM-
PFTITION § 7:26(D)(E) (2d ed. 1984). Under the analysis suggested here, the two sets of cases should
have come out differently. In the sports cases, the logo was used to refer to the trademark owner
and was thus necessary to the message in a way that is not implicated in the aesthetic functionality
cases.
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fact, of linguists. 30 And instead of determining whether "the principal
significance of the word... [is] its indication of the nature or class of an
article, . . . [or] an indication of its origin, '" ' the new inquiry would
establish the set of denotations and connotations associated with a mark
and determine whether there exists another effective mechanism for in-
voking that'set. Because acceptance into the. fabric of ordinary language
would indicate both that a mark possessed an expressive dimension and
that the public found this dimension a useful (and, possibly, needed) ad-
dition to the vocabulary, it would also be helpful to look at the informa-
tion that linguists use to decide whether a borrowing has been fully
received into the language: inclusion of the word in dictionaries, use un-
related to the original source of the word, respelling to conform to ac-
cepted patterns, inflection to conform to grammar, productivity in the
formation of new words, and failure of writers to italicize the word or use
its diacritics. 13 2
The facts reported in Quality Inns International, Inc. v. McDonald's Cor-
poration,'3 3 are somewhat illustrative of how this procedure might work.
The defendant, owner of a motel chain called "McSleep," was sued for
its unauthorized use of the prefix "Mc." Seeking to prove that "Mc" is
generic, it introduced through the testimony of an expert linguist a data
base consisting of writings that utilized the "Mc" construction. The lin-
guist successfully demonstrated that the data, which included such us-
ages as "McLaw" for franchise law firms, "McMiz" for roadshows of Les
Miserables, and "McPaper" for USA Today, tended to show that "Mc" is
the name for the class of services that are standardized, basic, consistent,
and convenient.13 4 The defense, however, ultimately lost. First, the de-
fendant failed to fully articulate the question its expert was to answer.
Since only questions as to the meaning of the word were asked, the testi-
mony was vulnerable to the claim that linguists have no special expertise
in decoding.'3 5 Second, the court took the many descriptive terms
needed to define the "Mc" concept as an indication that "[t]here was no
single independent meaning of "Mc" understood in the language," and
that therefore "Mc" could not be considered rhetorically unique.'3 6
Had the analysis suggested here been used, a fuller set of data would
have been compiled to determine not only the meaning of the prefix
"Mc" but also the availability of alternatives to the construction. An ab-
sence of synomyms may have persuaded the court that "Mc" was the
crystallization of an otherwise nameless conceptualization, defined by
terms like standardized, basic, consistent, and convenient. Although the
130 See, e.g., G. CANNON, supra note 8, 21-28 (describing the corpus forming the data base for his
language studies); R. HALL, supra note 90, 239-59 (describing studies of linguistic geography).
131 Feathercombs, Inc. v. Solo Prods. Corp., 306 F.2d 251, 256 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 910
(1962). Cf., e.g., G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 873 F.2d 985 (7th Cir. 1989).
132 G. CANNON, supra note 8, at 48, 69-70 (giving "hoover," a verb in England, as an example of a
somewhat productive trademark.
133 695 F. Supp. 198 (D. Md. 1988).
134 Id. at 215-16. The transcript contains a more comprehensive list of the words that describe
the category. See Tr. at 856.
135 Tr. at 1028.
136 695 F. Supp. at 216.
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defendant's use of this new word was very close to the signaling side of
the spectrum (it implied sponsorship), where the claim for access would
require establishing a high degree of necessity, the court might have
been persuaded to side with Quality Inns had it fully appreciated what
McDonald's had done. Rather than provide the public with a name for
this new concept and then advertise its own services as belonging to it,
McDonalds had promulgated a "McLanguage"' 137 in order to use the
availability of the vocabulary slot to make its trademark the sole vehicle
for discussing the conceptualization it had identified. 138
In the case of trademarks that are not merely metaphorical in the
manner in which all richly-associated words have that quality, but instead
are deliberately used as metaphors, further inquiry may be necessary.
Since the purpose of intentional metaphors is to surprise listeners into
considering a full associational set, 139 novelty can be important. Accord-
ingly, such usages would not receive sufficient protection from a test that
looked only to indicia of common acceptance For these cases, it is ap-
propriate to determine the relationship between the communication and
the mark. If the mark produces special insights and there are reasons
why other linguistic devices would not serve as well, the mark should be
considered situationally expressively generic.' 40
For an example, contrast Interbank Card Association v. Simms, 14 1 involv-
ing cards bearing the trademark "Master Charge" and the words "Give
Christ charge of your life," with L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc. ,142
which concerned a sexual version of the plaintiff's ubiquitous catalogue.
Use in the first case was probably closer to the expressive pole than use
in the second because the first defendant was a religious organization
while the second in the business of selling was magazines. Yet it is more
important to protect access in the second instance. In the first, there is
no discernable nexus between the trademark and the message. Since the
play on words provides no new insight into the attainment of spiritual
well being, the defendant's communicative capacity is not suppressed if
deprived of the use of the Master Charge mark.143 In the second, how-
ever, the message may be that intimate human interaction has been sacri-
ficed to efficiency considerations. Success of mail order in displacing
137 Id. at 203 (constructions included terms such as "McService," "McPrice," and "McBest").
138 It should be noted that the Patent and Trademark Office had some hostility to claims to a
family of marks, see Breitenfeld, When Is a "'Family of Trademarks" Effective, 52 TRADEMARK REP. 351
(1962). Failure to recognize these advertising strategies may have had the beneficial side effect of
preventing companies from creating privately controlled language.
139 Cf Davidson, supra note 95 (comparing effective metaphors, which require the listener to
determine the way in which the compared items are similar with dead metaphors (such as the mouth
of a river) in which the literal meaning of the phrase has been lost).
140 See Bayer v. United Drug Co., 272 F. Supp. (S.D.N.Y. 1921) (notes that even in traditional
trademark law, genericity can depend on the situation in which the mark is used).
141 431 F. Supp. 131 (So. N.D. Cal. 1977).
142 811 F.2d 26 (ist Cir.), appeal dismissed, 483 U.S. 1013 (1987).
143 A market-failure approach to trademark defenses would look at whether there is reason to
believe that rights could not be purchased in the normal course. Cf Gordon, Fair Use as .Mfarket
Failure: A- Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV.
1600 (1982). Under this view, the analysis might run as follows: Since many trademarks and slogans
are susceptible to equally effective spiritual messages, there is little fear that a religious group bent
on using trademarks would not be able to negotiate a license with some trademark owner.
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face-to-face shopping symbolizes this loss. Accordingly, there is a solid
fit between the impact of the communication and the use of the trade-
mark; L.L. Bean's role as a premier player in the catalogue market 44
provides a reason to believe that use of other marks would not provide
the identical impact."45
Admittedly, this rule has the property of penalizing precisely those
trademark owners who are so successful that their marks become the
symbols of their businesses. But the same is true of trademark owners
whose marks become competitively generic. The point of the genericity
doctrine is to encourage owners to avoid especially important terms and
to contribute new words to the public domain; since those that dominate
markets are best positioned to perform the latter function, it is they who
should receive the most encouragement. Besides, as the McDonalds ex-
ample illustrates, it is sometimes the case that dominance is used to sup-
press rival words by inviting the public to adopt the mark as the name for
the concept associated with the goods on which it acts as a signal.' 46 A
law that regulates the extent to which dominance can be used to competi-
tive advantage is not particularly exceptional.' 4 7
As with genericity, so with other items in the arsenal of trademark
defenses. Because trademark law differs from ordinary first amendment
jurisprudence precisely in the greater attention that it has paid to the
significance of words, as opposed to the content of communication, its
other facets may also be useful templates upon which to build safeguards
for speech. Thus, attention should be paid to defenses such as fair use,
functionality, abandonment, laches, and continuous prior use. Further
elaboration of these doctrines would flesh out the buffer between public
and private rights in words.148 In addition, this analysis may provide a
144 See, e.g., the cover of the October 1987 issue of Consumer Reports, which put the L.L. Bean
catalogue first in a picture of eight mail-order publications. See also id. at 614 (listing L.L. Bean as
one of the four largest mail-order companies).
It is interesting to note that marks likely to be considered expressively generic include the very
strong marks that are most likely to receive protection beyond traditional trademark law. Cf. Allied
Maintenance Corp. v. Allied Mechanical Trades, Inc., 42 N.Y.2d 538, 369 N.E.2d 1162, 399
N.Y.S.2d 628 (1977) (interpreting New York's dilution law as protecting only very strong marks). At
first blush, this result may seem incongruous, but it might actually work quite well. Commercial
contexts could be vigorously protected without worrying about access concerns as the new definition
of genericity would provide a defense to overintrusion into expressive requirements.
145 Admittedly, the fit between this mark and message is somewhat thin. Ifa market-failure analy-
sis of genericity is used, it is arguable that there are enough mail-order operations to make it likely
that Drake could have obtained a license to parody one of them. The fact that the use was editorial
does, however, move it toward the expressive end of the spectrum, which, under this analysis, re-
quires less of a showing of need than is required of uses with a higher signaling component.
146 Cf. Vuitton Et Fils S.A. v.J. Young Enters., 644 F.2d 769 (9th Cir. 198 1)(creating aesthetically
pleasing design with repetitions of a successful trademark).
147 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-11 (the Sherman Act); 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (the Clayton Act).
148 Attempts have already been made to use abandonment, which is defined in § 45 of the Lan-
ham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1988), in this way. In an interesting dissent to United States Jaycees v.
PhiladelphiaJaycees, 639 F.2d 134 (3d Cir. 1981) (upholding the national organization's trademark
right to prevent a splinter group from calling itself "Jaycees"), Judge Gibbons argued that the
'Jaycees" mark for mens' clubs had lost significance because the owner's course of conduct had
allowed third parties to equate the mark with nondiscriminatory associations. Id. at 147 (Gibbons,J.,
dissenting). The dissent might have been more persuasive hadJudge Gibbons separated the signal-
ing function of the mark (signifying a club) from its expressive connotation (signifying discrimina-
tory policies). Cf. Quality Inns Int'l, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 695 F. Supp. 198, 212-14 (D. Md.
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deeper understanding of the significance of word usages. With that
knowledge, first amendment jurisprudence could be altered to produce a
body of law more closely attuned to the communicative significance of
words, ideograms, and other symbols and signifiers.
III. Conclusion
It would be interesting to know whether expressive use of trade-
marks is expanding or whether the rate of trademark litigation has in-
creased as the right to control usage in hybrid cases has received greater
recognition. I suspect that in fact, both are true. Apparently, the gradu-
ates of the American educational system are no longer acquainted with
the classic literature that in the past formed the basis for rhetorical and
literary allusion. Betty Crocker has replaced Hestia in the public con-
sciousness. Accordingly, it is not surprising that speakers and writers are
drawn to those devices that are, by dint of heavy advertising, doubtlessly
universally familiar. At the same time, the popularity of marks as expres-
sive vehicles has spawned a new industry, and it is equally unsurprising
that those who made these devices so useful have asserted claims on the
profits that this industry generates.
I have made the assumption that proprietary claims to trademarks
and ideograms will not abate, and that marks will receive increasingly
vigorous protection across the signaling spectrum. Focusing on the lin-
guistic literature, which demonstrates the capacity of the mind to com-
prehend and exploit the multiple meaning of words, I have proposed a
method for developing a framework to protect the expressive dimension
of marks in the new legal climate. My hope is that the direction that I
have taken, which recognizes trademark law as the principal jurispruden-
tial tradition for analyzing the significance of words, will be pursued by
others. Trademark law possesses many features that allocate rights in
words, and these may be better than, or useful complements to, the
genericity approach that I have chosen as an illustration.
It would also be interesting to know whether the safeguards sug-
gested here are constitutionally compelled. I, however, have left that
question to another day. Outside the special context of the Amateur
Sports Act, the expansion of trademark rights is judicially driven, based
on interpretations of statutes and elaboration of the common law. The
same power that oversees the recognition of proprietary rights can be
used to erect limitations that safeguard public concerns.
1988). Because the USOC sponsored "'olympic" events for groups such as the handicapped, this
analysis may even have applied in the GaY Olmpics case. See 483 U.S. 522, 542 n. 22 (1987).
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